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Abstract
Georg Jellinek is known as one of the most prominent representative of German 
legal positivism. This article aims at identifying and discussing the more theoreti-
cal-political connotation of Jellinek’s thought with a particular focus on his liberal 
inspiration. According to the perspective of the history of political thought, this ar-
ticle shows how some intellectual premises to Jellinek’s liberalism take shape and 
emerge from a series of young Jellinek’s writings on history of philosophy and his-
tory of ideas.
Keywords: liberalism, limits to power, individual, State.   
Resumen
Georg Jellinek es generalmente conocido como un teórico y experto en dere-
cho	público,	como	exponente	del	positivismo	 jurídico	alemán	de	finales	del	siglo	
xix. Desde la perspectiva de la historia del pensamiento político, este artículo tiene 
como objetivo rescatar del pensamiento de este importante autor la connotación teó-
rico-política de inspiración liberal. Más precisamente, el artículo trata de demonstrar 
cómo algunas de las raíces intelectuales del pensamiento liberal de Jellinek pueden 
ser	en	parte	identificadas	en	una	serie	de	escritos	de	juventud	sobre	la	historia	de	la	
filosofía	y	la	historia	de	las	ideas.
Palabras clave: liberalismo, límites del poder, individuo, Estado.
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de  las Ideas Políticas    
Vol. 19. Núm. 1 (2016):  59-76
ISSN: 1576-4184
http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rev_RPUB.2016.v19.n1.52206
Sara Lagi               The Formation of a Liberal Thinker... 
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de  las Ideas Políticas    
Vol. 19. Núm. 1 (2016): 59-76
60
1. Introductory considerations: the early writings of a liberal thinker
In 1872, the future representative of German legal positivism, Georg Jellinek 
(1851-1911), was invited to publicly present his dissertation on Die Weltanschau-
ungen Leibniz’ und Schopenhauers (The Worldviews of Leibniz and Schopenhauer)1 
with which in the same year he had earned his doctorate in philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Vienna. A work in which the young author compared the philosophical 
worldviews	of	the	two	renowned	German	thinkers,	identifying	in	the	first	the	repre-
sentative of optimism and in the second the champion of pessimism. No trace of the 
theory of State and law: the dissertation of 1872 was an erudite and elegant exercise 
in the history of philosophy.2 The beginnings for the father of the Allgemeine Staat-
slehre (General Doctrine of Law and State)	were	 therefore	 linked	 to	 a	 scientific	
field	well	removed	from	that	of	legal	science.	It	is	correct	to	note	that	the	first	of	his	
intellectual passions was philosophy.3
Six years after the presentation of his dissertation, the scholar gave a lengthy dis-
course at the Association of Friends of Literature in Vienna on an apparently singular 
theme, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza (Goethe’s relationship with Spinoza).4 
He thus had the opportunity to combine his interest in philosophy with his interest in 
literature and, in particular, in the work of Johann Wolfgang Goethe who, with Less-
ing, Kant, and Schiller, comprised what Jellinek designated “the four evangelists”, 
points of reference not only for the young scholar but also for the German-Jewish 
middle-class culture from which he came.5 
1 G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauung Leibniz‘ und Schopenhauer. Ihre Gründe und ihre Berechtigung. 
Eine Studie über Optimismus und Pessimismus. (Inauguraldissertation), Wien, Alfred Hölder, 1872, 
in Id., Ausgewählte Schriften und Reden, Band 1, Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1970 (Neudruck der Ausgabe 
Berlin 1911), pp. 3-41. For the Italian translation of this writing see now: G. Jellinek, Le concezioni 
del mondo di Leibniz e Schopenhauer. Fondamenti e giustificazione. Uno studio sull‘ottimismo e il 
pessimismo. Dissertazione inaugurale tenuta a Vienna nel 1872, in Id., Il “Tutto” e l‘“Individuo”. 
Scritti di Filosofia, Politica e Diritto, a cura di S. Lagi, Catanzaro, Rubbettino, 2015, pp. 69-107.
2 From 1879 to 1889 Jellinek taught at the University of Vienna, experiencing in the Habsburg capital 
the	most	difficult	and	tormented	period	of	his	academic	career.	See:	C.	Keller,	Viktor Ehrenberg und 
Georg Jellinek im Spiegel ihres Briefwechsels 1872-1911, in Id., Viktor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek. 
Briefwechsel des 19. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 2005, pp. 22-33; see also: 
C. Jellinek, Ein Lebensbild, entworfen von seiner Witwe Camilla Jellinek, in G. Jellinek, Ausgewählte 
Schriften und Reden, Band 1, op. cit., pp. 7-140. 
3 A. Fijal-R.R. Wiengärtner, “Georg Jellinek, Universalgelehrter und Jurist”, in Juristische Schuulung 
XXVII, 1987, pp. 97-100, here p. 98.
4 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza. Vortrag gehalten im Vereine der Literaturfreunde 
zu Wien, Wien, Alfred Hölder, 1878, in Id., Ausgewählte Schriften und Reden, Band 1, op. cit., pp. 
178-207. For the Italian translation of this writing see now: G. Jellinek, Il rapporto di Goethe con 
Spinoza. Relazione tenuta alla Associazione “Amici della letteratura” di Vienna, in Id., Il “Tutto” e 
l‘“Individuo”. Scritti di Filosofia, Politica e Diritto, op. cit., pp. 109-138.    
5 C. Keller, op. cit., p. 28.
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The texts to which we have just referred and the themes and characters discussed 
within should not surprise us. It is enough to simply browse the extensive database 
of Jellinekian thought that are the Ausgewählte Schriften und Reden (Selected Writ-
ings and Discourses)6—a collection of essays, speeches, and writings that the jurist 
elaborated in the course of his intellectual and academic life— to realize an incon-
testable fact, namely the impressive diversity of Jellinek’s interests: the history of 
political thought, the history of ideas, philosophy, music, theater, literature, poetry, 
and as well, law.
Before becoming one of the most authoritative representatives of German legal 
positivism of the century, Jellinek was an intellectual in the fullest sense, in the 
truest and deepest meaning of the term, a true scholar. His interests were varied, 
eclectic, and his own theory of law and State—in this, profoundly different from 
the cold formalism of Hans Kelsen7—was interwoven with references to histor-
ical and cultural-historical dimensions, to the history of political thought, and to 
philosophy. It was Jellinek in fact who asserted “legal science could not exclude 
historical analysis”.8 
In this sense, one of the most famous examples was his essay of 1895 dedicated 
to the Erklärungen der Menschen und Bürgerrechte (The Declarations of the Rights 
of Man and of Citizens).9 Jellinek formed a comparison between the American Bills 
of Rights and the French Declaration of 1898, with a dual purpose. First, he sought to 
explain the originality of the Bills of Rights charter, focusing on the particular histor-
ical and cultural conditions in which they had developed. Second, he sought to legit-
imate, by means of this very analysis, his historicist and positivist conception of law 
and State, demonstrating how the Bills of Rights does not contain abstract freedoms 
and rights in the natural sense but freedom and rights that the earlier settlers directly 
and concretely experienced in history, before the American Revolution, freedom and 
rights that were subsequently put to paper.10
6 G. Jellinek, Ausgewählte Schriften und Reden, op. cit.
7 For a critical approach to Jellinek and Kelsen see the fundamental H. Heller, Souveranität. Ein 
Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats und Völkerrechts, Berlin und Leipzig, W. De Gruyter, 1927. In this case, 
we referred to the Italian translation  in Id., La sovranità e altri scritti sulla dottrina del diritto e dello 
Stato, a cura di P. Pasquino, Milano, Giuffrè, 1987, pp. 67-301.
8 G. Jellinek, La politica dell‘assolutismo e quella del radicalismo. Hobbes e Rousseau, [Italian trans. 
of Id., Die Politik des Absolutismus und des Radikalismus (Hobbes und Rousseau). Vortrag gehalten 
in der Aula des Museums zu Basel am 10. Februar 1891, in Id., Ausgewählte Schriften und Reden, op. 
cit.,] in S. Lagi (a cura di), Georg Jellinek. Storico del pensiero politico (1883-1905), Firenze, CET, 
2009, p. 53.
9 G. Jellinek, Die Erklärungen der Bürger und Menschenrechte. Beitrag zur Geschichte des 
Verfassungsrechts, München und Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1895. See: D. Kelly, “Revisiting the 
Rights of Man: Georg Jellinek on Rights and State”, in Law and History Review 22, 3, 2004, pp. 493-529.
10 G. Jellinek, Das Recht der Minoritäten, hrsg. und eingeleitet von W. Pauly, Goldbach, Keip Verlag, 
1996, pp. 1-48.
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It is in the context of this diversity of interests and lines of research—here syn-
thetically noted—that Jellinek’s dissertation on the two renowned German philoso-
phers and his discourse dedicated to Goethe and Spinoza become better understood.11 
If we wanted to stop at this level of analysis, we would limit ourselves to read-
ing Jellinek’s two early writings as a mere divertissement of a particularly erudite 
character driven by a voracious curiosity for diverse areas of knowledge. However, 
it is our belief that the essays dedicated to the two German thinkers, to Goethe, and 
to Spinoza – the father of Ethica more geometrico demonstrata – offer something 
more. The literature has extensively analyzed Jellinek’s legal theory, his doctrine 
of law and State, his model of constitutional justice, his theory of subjective public 
rights, and this same literature has in general agreed in attributing an unquestionably 
liberal value and matrix to the Rechts e Staastlehre of the Hebrew-German thinker. 
Maurizio Fioravanti, in fact, effectually observed that never in Jellinek is there the 
endeavor to reduce the relationship between the State and the citizens in terms of 
“mere dominion”.12 
11 C. Keller, op. cit., p. 22.
12 For the liberal connotation of Jellinek’s legal and political theory see: V. Emanuele Orlando, 
Introduzione a G. Jellinek-V. E. Orlando, La dottrina generale del diritto dello Stato [Italian trans. of 
G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1900], Milano, Giuffré, 1949, p. XVI f. M. Stolleis, Geschichte 
des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland (1814-1900), Bd. 2, München, C. B. Verlag, 1992, p. 145 f; M. 
La Torre, Disavventure del diritto soggettivo. Una vicenda teorica, Milano, Giuffrè, 1996, pp. 144 f; 
C. Schönberger, “Ein Liberaler zwischen Staatswille und Volkswille. Georg Jellinek und die Krise des 
staatsrechtlichen Positivismus um die Jahrhundertwende”, in S. L. Paulson, M. Schulte (hrsg. von), 
Georg Jellinek. Beiträge zu Leben und Werk, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2000, pp. 3-32; J. Kersten, op. 
cit., p. 17; W. Pauly, Majorität und Minorität, Introduction to G. Jellinek, Das Recht der Minoritäten, 
op. cit., pp. VII-XIV; D. Quaglioni, “Sovranità e autolimitazione (Rileggendo la «Dottrina generale 
dello Stato di G. Jellinek)”, in M. Basciu (a cura di), Crisi e metamorfosi della sovranità. Atti del xix 
Congresso nazionale della Società italiana di filosofia giuridica e politica. Trento 29-30 settembre 
1994, Milano, Giuffrè, 1996, pp. 273-282 and by the same author La sovranità, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 
2004, pp. 96-100; Also, see: M. Fioravanti, La scienza del diritto pubblico. Dottrine dello Stato e 
della Costituzione tra Otto e Novecento, Tomo I, Milano, Giuffré, 2001, p. 6; Id., Lo “Stato moderno” 
nella dottrina della Costituzione della prima età moderna del Novecento (1900-1940) in Id., Ordo 
Iuris. Storia e forme dell’esperienza giuridica, Milano, Giuffrè, 2003, p. 185; O. Jounjan (ed.), Figures 
de l’Etat de droit. Le Rechtstaat dans l’historire intellectuelle et constituionelle de l’Allemagne, 
Strasbourg, Presses Universitaire de Strasbourg, 2001, pp. 293-312; W. Pauly-M.Siebinger, “Staat und 
Individuum. Georg Jellineks Staatslehre”, in A. Anter (hrsg. von), Die normative Kraft des Faktischen. 
Das Staatsverständnis Georg Jellineks, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2005, pp. 135-151; R. Marra; 
La religione dei diritti. Durkheimer, Jellinek, Weber, Torino, Giappichelli, 2006; More recently, J. 
Von Bernstoff, “Georg Jellinek and the Origins of Liberal Constitutionalism in International Law”, 
Göttingen Journal of International Law 4, 2012, pp.659-675.; D. Drüll, Heidelberger Gelhertlexikon 
1803-1932, Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer Verlag, 2012.
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Salvo Mastellone noted that Jellinek “sought to give liberal society legal justi-
fication	with	a	general	 theory	of	 law’”.13	Such	 justification	was	developed	around	
the concept of self-limitation (Selbstbeschränkung) and subjective public rights. In 
1892, Jellinek dedicated one of his most famous works to these concepts, Das Sys-
tem der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (The System of Subjective Public Rights), in 
which the jurist maintained that subjective public rights are founded in the self-lim-
itation enacted by the State, conceiving for the State a dual role: singular holder of 
sovereignty and at the same time subject according to the limits in relating itself to 
the citizens.14
The	principle	 of	 self-limitation	 and	 its	 affirmation	 of	 a	 sphere	 of	 freedom	 for	
citizens encompass in its most concise form the liberal heart of Jellinek’s legal and 
political view and more precisely his endeavor to imagine a “liberal society”. At 
the same time, all his works, including the Allgemeine Staatslehre (General Theory 
of the State) (1900), were interwoven with references to the great classics of liber-
al-political and liberal-democratic thought: Benjamin Constant, J. S. Mill, Alexis 
de Tocqueville, James Calhoun, Herbert Spencer, to name a few of those most fre-
quently	cited.	An	even	more	relevant	aspect,	one	of	the	more	significant	works	in	
Jellinek’s extensive production is an essay, published in 1898, entitled Das Recht 
der Minoritäten (The Rights of Minorities),15 in which the professor of Heidelberg 
considered a theme particularly dear to him and to liberal tradition itself: the protec-
tion of minorities as an antidote against the tyranny of the majority and against the 
degradation of democratic society, dangers already exposed many years before by 
one of his favorite thinkers, Alexis de Tocqueville.16 
This overview of Jellinek’s work and thought presents and issue, however, in 
terms of the history of political thought, quite relevant to us: to understand the extent 
to which the early writings on Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Goethe, and Spinoza found 
voice	in	the	jurispolitical	liberal	reflections	of	this	Hebrew-German	intellectual.	On	
the following pages, we will endeavor to demonstrate how these contributions— 
chronologically preceding the theory of self-limitation, the work on subjective pub-
lic rights and also those on the rights of minorities and other writings from which 
emerged a liberal political sensitivity— encompass an intellectual vision, a Weltan-
schauug, that, in part, we rediscover in his major works. It is our judgment that this 
intellectual vision is fully presupposed in the principle of self-limitation and, in a 
broader	sense,	in	the	endeavor	to	think	and	define	a	liberal	society	capable	of	guar-
13 S. Mastellone, Storia del pensiero politico europeo xix-xx, Torino, UTET, 2002, p. 99; G. De Ruggiero, 
Storia del liberalismo europeo,	Roma-Bari,	Laterza,	[first	edition	1925],	1995,	pp.	275-277.
14 G. Jellinek, Sistema dei diritti pubblici soggettivi [Italian trans. of Id., System der subjektiven 
öffentlichen Rechte, 1892], Milano-Napoli, Società Editrice Libraria, 1912.
15 For the Italian translation of this writing see now: G. Jellinek, Il diritto delle minoranze, in Id., Il 
“Tutto” e l‘“Individuo”. Scritti di Filosofia, Politica e Diritto, op. cit., pp. 165-205.
16 G. Jellinek, Das Recht der Minoritäten, op. cit., p. 44 f.
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anteeing rights, a sphere of freedom, and the protection of minorities, because—as 
Jellinek wrote in Das Recht der Minoritäten— “all progress of history originated 
from the minorities. And in this regard, signs exist that in the best natures something 
moves	in	opposition	to	 the	dominant	currents	 that	I	would	define	as	 the	obstinate	
sentiment of the minority”.17
The essays that we chose to bring to the attention of the reader—the dissertation 
on the two German philosophers and the discourse on Goethe and Spinoza—can 
help	us	not	only	to	grasp	the	unedited	nuances	of	the	intellectual	figure	of	Jellinek	
but also to understand – in a perspective of the history of political thought – some of 
the profound roots of his liberal vision, before his liberal vision fully formed in the 
works of his maturity. 
2. Georg Jellinek, interpreter of Leibniz and Schopenhauer
We previously noted that Jellinek never reduced the relationship between State 
and citizens to a mere question of dominion and subordination, rather—as Massi-
mo La Torre noted—in Jellinek’s works, individuals are always connected in the 
fabric of the community, always considered an integral part of a larger reality, of a 
“Whole”, of the community.18 
Jellinek’s liberal jurispolitical view, developed from the 1880s to the early 1900s, 
is	formulated	precisely	around	two	poles	of	reflection	and	interest:	the	State	and	the	
citizens, the community and the individuals. In our opinion, the writings we have se-
lected enable us to better understand the intellectual roots of this polarity, absolutely 
central to the legal and political thought of this German scholar. 
The	 dissertation	 on	Leibniz	 and	 Schopenhauer	was,	 first	 of	 all,	 an	 articulated	
reflection	on	optimism,	of	which,	according	to	Jellinek,	the	father	of	La Monadolo-
gie19 had been the most representative, and on pessimism, embodied by the author of 
Parerga und Paralipomena.20
The young scholar made transparent his preference for Leibniz’s thought and 
related	the	works	of	the	two	German	philosophers,	first	and	foremost,	to	the	par-
ticular historical and cultural context in which they had evolved. According to 
Jellinek, the philosophy of Leibniz gave voice to a period of great and positive 
transformation	especially	for	the	German	people,	who	finally	knew	a	new	peace	
after the tragedy of the Thirty Years’ War,21 whereas the work and thought of 
Schopenhauer	reflected	an	era	of	 torment	and	deep	contrast,	marked	by	the	 tri-
17 Ibidem, p. 45.
18 M. La Torre, La crisi del Novecento. Giuristi e filosofi nel crepuscolo di Weimar, Bari, Ed. Dedalo, 
2006, p. 36. We translated the Italian term “Tutto” – used by La Torre in his book – with “Whole”.
19 G. W. Leibniz, La Monadologie (1720).
20 A. Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften (1851).
21 G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauung Leibniz‘ und Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 17. 
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umph of Romanticism with its Weltschmerz of which Schopenhauer was one of 
its greatest “singers.”22
Reference to historical context comprised only the initial part of the analysis pro-
posed and developed by Jellinek: through a careful study of the philosophy of Lei-
bniz and that of Schopenhauer, Jellinek investigated the fundamentals of optimism 
and pessimism, concluding in the former an expression of a profoundly “universalis-
tic”	vision	and	in	the	latter	an	irreducible	“subjectivism”.	Both	definitions—“univer-
salism and subjectivism”—presuppose, for Jellinek, a particular way of understand-
ing the relationship between the “Whole” and the “individual”, between the “Whole” 
and the “single thing”.23 
In the essay of 1872, these terms carried a purely philosophical significance:	
Leibniz, as interpreted by Jellinek, elaborated a view, monadology, that succeeded in 
grasping the “Whole and the individual”, in a reciprocal relationship, never in con-
flict.24 Behind this conception, Jellinek perceived a spirit and individuality in their 
turn deeply harmonious:
With a universal view Leibniz observes reality: in the great he does not forget the 
small, so much the foundation of his philosophy. He represents, in the deepest sense 
of	the	word,	a	veritable	microcosm,	in	which	are	reflected	all	the	tendencies	of	his	
era,	all	the	scientific	and	religious	efforts	and	achievements.25
The future author of the Allgemeine Staatslehre recognized in Leibniz the ability 
to think in terms of “unity and harmony”:
If	 two	views	find	themselves	in	reciprocal	opposition	to	each	other,	he	seeks	to	
reconcile, unite, and transform the dissonance into harmony. In him are overcome 
all	contradictions	and	conflicts.	His	scientific	work	and	practice	consists	essen-
tially	 of	 continuous	 efforts	 to	 unify	 conflicting	 doctrines	 and	 therefore	 surpass	
the rifts that separate political and religious parties. He wants to unite Plato and 
Aristotle, the theological and the mechanical, nature and creation, the Protestant 
church and the Catholic, the Evangelical church and the Reformed, in Germany 
the imperial power and the territorial sovereignty, and in England the Tories and 
the Whigs.26
22 Ibidem, pp. 28-29. 
23 Ibidem, p. 20.
24 We translated the German term “Ganze” with “Whole”, whereas we translated “Einzelne” with 
“Individual, Individual thing, single thing”.
25 G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauung Leibniz‘ und Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 17.
26 Ibidem, p. 18.
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Citing Kuno Fischer27 and his Geschichte der Philosophie (History of Philos-
ophy) Jellinek summarized the “universalistic” character of Leibniz’s philosophy:
In this sense, the search for mediation between opposites and for universality in 
the	most	elevated	sense	of	the	word	constitutes	the	most	significant	element	in	the	
personality	 of	 our	 philosopher.	He	understands	 the	most	 significant	 relationships	
and moves toward the broader horizons. The harmony of the world—this thought 
so deeply ingrained in his philosophical system and life—is always, consistently 
present. He knows that those grievous and painful contradictions that concern us in 
a precise moment of life are nothing other than “false notes” in passing, unable to 
disturb the harmony of things.28
From Leibniz’s philosophy transpires a profoundly harmonious vision, according 
to Jellinek, full of trust that even evil and opposition will end up vanishing, annul 
themselves in a process that veers, inevitably and necessarily, toward development 
and progress.29 
In Leibniz, Jellinek perceived the superseding of contradictions, the capacity to 
see the “cosmos unfolded in each of its smallest parts”.30 The interesting aspect for 
us is not so much to evaluate the objectivity (or lack thereof) in the young scholar’s 
interpretation of the German philosopher as much as to follow Jellinek step by step 
in his comparison of the author of La Monadologie and Arthur Schopenhauer. In 
the latter—Jellinek emphasized—the “universalism” of Leibniz, or the capacity to 
think about the “Whole and the individual” in terms of accord, is replaced by an 
extreme “subjectivism”, well summarized in the expression “the world as will and 
representation”:31 
Subjectivism is the fundamental character of his philosophical system. The individ-
ual represents, according to him [Schopenhauer], the whole world, the macrocosm 
and microcosm. From here derives his inability to understand historical phenomena 
and to identify with another individuality.32  
27 Kuno Fischer (1824-1907) was a German philosopher and a historian of philosophy; he was a 
follower of the Hegelian school.  
28 K. Fischer, Geschichte der neuen Philosophie, Bd. II, G. W. Leibniz und seine Schule, Mannheim, 
1855, p. 10, p. 22, quoted in G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauung Leibniz‘ und Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 
19.
29 Ibidem, p. 17.
30 Ibidem, p. 12.
31 A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819).
32 G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauungen Leibniz‘ und Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 28; p. 21. 
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“Subjectivism”	inevitably,	according	to	Jellinek,	led	to	a	profoundly	conflictual	
vision:33
Everywhere	Schopenhauer	 sees	 struggle	 and	 conflict,	 already	 at	 the	 lowest	 level	
of	objectification	of	 the	will	 the	centrifugal	 force	finds	 itself	 in	opposition	 to	 the	
centripetal,	and	such	a	contrast	becomes	ever	fiercer	as	we	enter	into	the	essence	of	
nature. He knows only thesis and antithesis, not synthesis. And it is for this reason 
that he sympathizes with the doctrine of Schelling, the doctrine of polarity, [...] with 
that Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes.34   
In Schopenhauer’s Weltanschauung,	Jellinek	believed	to	also	perceive	the	influ-
ence of particular biographical elements: the substantial failure of the philosopher’s 
work; the indifference by the public and by leading scholars of his day did nothing 
but engender in him a melancholy, an obstinate pessimism, an extreme “subjectiv-
ism”, so ingrained and complete, according to Jellinek, as to “crush” and undermine 
the very foundation of his metaphysics.35 
This latter, the young scholar noted, corresponds to the principle of an eternal, 
irrational, uncaused “single will” that represents the “true vision of the world”, a 
principle in which Jellinek perceived an element of “universalism” since, in his judg-
ment, the “single will” comes to substantially identify with something existing eter-
nally in respect to which individuals, with all their passions and suffering, end up 
appearing	nothing	more	than	mere	fleeting	“apparitions”.36 In his essay of 1872, Jell-
inek	identified	precisely	those	passages	of	Schopenhauer’s	work	from	which	seemed	
to emerge, paradoxically, a sort of indifference to “all that is individual”, but at the 
same time noted that this sort of underground “aspiration to the universal” ends up 
hopelessly obscured and hidden by “subjectivism”, from the incessant lament over 
the tragic fate of humanity.37 
Nevertheless, what really interested Jellinek was highlighting the far-reaching 
implications of a Schopenhauer-type pessimism: this pessimism, in his opinion, de-
cidedly refutes any notion of progress, of development, and therefore—unlike Lei-
bniz—maintains that “history brings before our eyes only the nullity and futility of 
human aspirations” 38:
Who	sees	 in	himself	 the	whole	world	will	 then	be	easily	 led	 to	project	and	reflect	
on the things of his own humors and personal sufferings [...] Who in an insensitive 
33 Ibidem, p. 24.
34 Ibidem, pp. 24-25.
35 Ibidem, pp. 32-33.
36 Ibidem.
37 Ibidem.
38 Ibidem, p. 22.
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and ungenerous nature sees only struggle and hatred, who conceives opposition and 
conflict	as	the	basic	elements	of	Being	then	will	not	be	able	to	recognize	in	the	world	
any omnipresent, creative reason, because the world will inevitably appear to him the 
product of blind power, senseless and dark, unbound by any law, by any reasoning.39
In this sense, for Jellinek, Schopenhauer rejected the idea of a rational principle 
underlying life, the world, reality, and thus the idea of a greater design within which 
the “the Whole and the single thing” could successfully harmonize. In other words, 
Schopenhauer rejected that very principle that, according to Jellinek, was fully ac-
knowledged and esteemed by Leibniz. The contrast between the two German philos-
ophers could therefore not be more evident:
On the one hand the highest objectivity, on the other the most profound subjectiv-
ism. On the one hand harmony, on the other the most strident dissonance. On the 
one hand, the love for humanity and the joy that comes from doing and creating; on 
the other, contempt for the world, the search for quietude, and the distancing from 
worldly semblances.40
According to Jellinek, only Leibniz could be considered a “true” philosopher, 
precisely because Leibniz was able to think in “universalistic” terms, and to the 
ranks of “true philosophers” the young scholar ascribed Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, 
Kant,	and	Hegel,	but	definitely	not	Schopenhauer.41 
Again Jellinek emphasized his spiritual and intellectual adherence to Leibniz’s 
optimism as an expression of a universalistic thought, capable of grasping the har-
monious relationship between the “Whole and the individual”. At the same time, he 
named Spinoza as another worthy representative of the “universalistic” concept. 
Some	years	later,	the	Hebrew-Dutch	thinker	would	find	himself	a	central	subject	
of Jellenikian analysis, with the scope of understanding the relationship between 
Spinoza and the “greatest German poet”, Wolfgang Goethe. With the essay of 1878, 
as we will try to demonstrate, Jellinek further developed the themes and ideas dis-
cussed in the dissertation of 1872.
 
3. Jellinek, interpreter of Goethe and Spinoza
If true that Kant and Hegel were two essential points of reference in Jellinek’s 
work and thought,42 equally undeniable is the fascination the young scholar exert-
39 Ibidem, pp. 25-26.
40 Ibidem, p. 20.
41 Ibidem, p. 28.
42 M. La Torre, La crisi del Novecento. Giuristi e filosofi nel crepuscolo di Weimar, op. cit., p. 18.
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ed on the author of Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order. Exactly as with 
Leibniz and Schopenhauer, Jellinek described and analyzed what he considered the 
essential aspects of Spinoza’s Weltanschauung, drawing from biographical data. 
Jellinek thus spoke of the unfortunate life of the Hebrew philosopher from Amster-
dam, repudiated by his own religious community because of his ideas and his inter-
pretation of sacred texts, constrained to remain a lens grinder, and yet—according 
Jellinek—capable of possessing and embodying a calm, balanced, peaceful vision of 
existence.43 The future exponent of legal positivism maintained that such “peace of 
mind” transpires from Spinoza’s philosophical worldview, centered on the concept 
of “God-Nature”, a concept that had caused much scandal. Jellinek, accordingly, 
summarized the “heart” of Spinoza’s philosophy:   
In the opening pages [of Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometric Order] one immedi-
ately comes upon the assertion that God constitutes unity with creative Nature, that 
we can represent it—by means of human analogy—as endowed with human under-
standing and human will, that thought and corporeal being are not two entities, sep-
arate substances, but two different aspects that show us the divine unitary essence.44
Jellinek insisted particularly on the fact that the “God-Nature” imagined by Spi-
noza is a principle capable of including and embracing all:
In his book Spinoza also taught that good and evil exists only in the minds of men, 
and that before God-Nature all actions had the same value, since everything hap-
pened	according	to	the	same,	identical	necessity.	He	explained	that	all	selfish	pas-
sions rendered man a slave and weak, that only the knowledge of such truths could 
lead to true freedom of the spirit and true wisdom.45
Already in the dissertation of 1872, Jellinek had designated Spinoza one of the 
most distinguished exponents of the “universalistic” worldview; with the some 
years’	distance	from	the	dissertation,	he	 identified	 in	 the	philosophy	of	Spinoza	a	
true form of “pantheism”.46 
It was this particular aspect, according to Jellinek, that attracted and intrigued the 
young Goethe who became interested in Spinoza’s philosophy to such an extent as 
to consider it a fundamental point of reference in his life as a man and as an artist. 
In this regard, Jellinek cited a passage from Goethe’s letter to Knebel,47 in which the 
43 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza, op. cit., pp. 178-179.
44 Ibidem, p. 181.
45 Ibidem.
46 Ibidem.
47 Karl Ludwig von Knebel (1744-1834), German poet and translator; Knebel introduced Goethe into 
the prestigious Court of Weimar.
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young poet declared his admiration for Spinoza, in open contrast with those, such 
as Jacobi for example,48 who had accused Spinoza of professing a sort of atheism:  
You know that I do not share your opinion—writes Goethe to a friend with whom 
at one time he had found himself in perfect harmony—you know that, for me, spi-
nozism and atheism are two distinct things; you know that the work of Spinoza, for 
me, is of great clarity, and that, despite not having his same way of imagining nature, 
if I were to indicate the book, among the many read, that is closest to my thinking, 
I would indicate the Ethica. I remain therefore faithful to the concept of God that 
atheists have and leave to you all that you should call religion.49
In many parts of his essay, Jellinek underscored how Goethe himself had recog-
nized a deep intellectual debt to the author of the Ethica. In other words, according 
to Jellinek, the poet had been attracted by the “universalistic” and “pantheistic” char-
acter of Spinoza’s philosophy: in the light of this consideration, it is possible to draw 
a perfect line of continuity between the dissertation of 1872 and essay of 1878—and 
more precisely between Leibniz and Spinoza, universalistic thinkers—on the one 
hand, and Goethe, admirer of the philosophy of Spinoza, on the other. For Jellinek, 
what	unite	these	figures,	who	belong	to	very	diverse	historical	and	cultural	contexts,	
are the desire, the need, and the ability to regard the “Whole”. In this regard, Jell-
inek could well observe how “all the doctrines that spoke of a rift in the world, [...] 
that cast the divine in a distant, unreachable, and unknowable dimension seemed to 
Goethe incomprehensible or simply detestable”.50  
Jellinek	was	porting	the	hat	of	the	historian	of	literature	when	he	identified	the	
passages	 of	Goethe’s	 poems	 in	which,	 in	 his	 opinion,	Spinoza’s	 influence	 shone.	
Among these, for example, Jellinek cited the well-known Bei Betrachten des Schil-
lers Schädel (Lines on Seeing Schiller’s Skull), which, though composed by Goethe 
in old age, contained intact and unaltered the Spinoza sensibility that, in Jellinek’s 
opinion, had always characterized the art of Goethe the poet. Addressing his dear 
friend and genial artist now deceased, Goethe declaimed:
What greater gain in life can man e’er know 
Than when God-Nature will to him explain
48 Friederich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), son of a wealthy Jewish family from Düsseldorf. He studied 
Spinoza’s thought and work in depth and personally knew Goethe.
49 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza, op. cit., pp. 185-186. Jellinek quoted Goethe’s 
Annalen in which the poet declared to be profoundly disappointed by Jacobi’s essay Von den göttlichen 
Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung (On God’s Things) (1811) accusing Spinoza to profess atheism. In 
his work Jacobi targeted and criticized one of the most prominent exponents of German Idealism, 
Friederich Schelling (1775-1854).
50 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza, op. cit., p. 187.
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How	into	Spirit	steadfastness	may	flow,
How steadfast, too, the Spirit-Born remain.51
It was Spinoza’s pantheism—and therefore a profoundly “universalistic” con-
cept—that, according to Jellinek, emerged with these powerful words. Also in Faust, 
Jellinek	continued	to	perceive	the	powerful	influence	of	the	Spinozian	Weltanscha-
uung on the German poet:        
How everything moves toward the whole;
each in the other works and lives,
like seraphs climbing up and down,
passing to one another gold buckets!
On blessed fragrant wings
pressing from heaven toward earth,
all sounding through the All with harmony!.52
Nevertheless, Jellinek observed, Goethe retained his particular individuality, 
his own peculiarities, which rendered him very different from Spinoza. Here again 
Jellinek	compared	the	philosopher	and	the	poet	but	with	the	specific	intent	to	bet-
ter understand the originality of the latter. On a fundamental point, Jellinek noted, 
the paths of the philosopher and the poet diverge: in Spinoza, the singular element, 
the	single	part,	the	individual,	the	single	thing	is	nullified	in	the	“God-Nature”,	in	
the	higher	“unity	of	the	divine”,	in	which	all	is	finally	peace	and	balance,	whereas	
Goethe, poet and artist, felt—according to the young scholar—a fundamental duty 
to endorse “the individual”, the individual spirit in its originality:
For the artist, individuals must bring in themselves a kernel of eternity, they must—
and	this	is	what	true	art	should	know	how	to	communicate—affirm	their	particular-
ity in respect to the divine principle that envelops and accommodates all in itself. 
It is by this Goethe succeeds in regarding the particularity of each one and compre-
hending	the	singular	character	[...]	For	him,	the	world	represents	an	infinite	variety,	
an	 infinite	wealth	 of	 sentient	 beings	 united	 to	 the	 omnipresent	God	 and	 through	
him are ever-present. [...] A contemplative nature like Spinoza’s wholly desired to 
51 Ibidem, p. 191. Jellinek was quoting form Goethe’s poem Bei Betrachten des Schillers Schädel 
(1827). For the English translation see: H. H. Boyesen, Goethe’s Works: pt 1-2. The Life of Goethe, 
Philadelphia, New York, Boston, George Barrie, 1885, p. 167.
52 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza, op. cit., p. 191. Jellinek was quoting from Goethe’s 
Faust (1808; 1832). For the English translation see: J. W. Goethe, Faust/Goethe, translated by C.F. 
McIntyre, New York, New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1949, p. 10. 
Sara Lagi               The Formation of a Liberal Thinker... 
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de  las Ideas Políticas    
Vol. 19. Núm. 1 (2016): 59-76
72
recognize in the surpassing of the self the highest and noblest purpose to achieve, but 
a	poetically	creative	spirit	like	Goethe’s	had	to	seek	and	pursue	self-affirmation.53  
So as Goethe’s poetry carried the traces of the spirit of Spinoza, so it bore the 
traces of the spirit of Goethe, who, while deeply admiring the Hebrew-Dutch philos-
opher, asserted the greatness of the individual and of “original individuality as the 
most precious asset”.54 In this regard, Jellinek cited a passage from the West-Östli-
cher Divan (West-East Divan) that allowed him to most effectively illustrate the 
distance that separated Goethe from Spinoza:
There’s not a life we need refuse 
If our true self we do not miss,
There’s not a thing one may not lose
If one remain the man he is.55
In the essay on Spinoza and Goethe, Jellinek’s attention moved gradually from 
the “Whole” to the individual, because, in his view, the German poet had been able 
to	fully	grasp	the	significance	of	individuality,	the	great	contribution	it	could	offer	
in terms of collective development and progress, and because of this—Jellinek ob-
served—unlike Spinoza, Goethe had been able to develop a philosophy of history, 
of Nature that entailed change, perpetual action and continual mutability.56 Again 
Jellinek found full expression of this concept in the art of the poet who in Eins und 
Alles (One and All) wrote:
And what was not shall spring to birth,
As purest sun, or painted earth.
God’s universe may know no rest.
It must go on, creating, changing,
Through endless shapes forever ranging.
And rest we only “seem” to see.57 
53 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza, op. cit., p. 198.
54 Ibidem.
55 Ibidem, p. 201. Jellinek was quoting from West-Östlicher Divan (1818). For the English translation 
see: J. W. Goethe, West and East Divan. The Poems: with “Notes and Essays”: Goethe’s Intercultural 
Dialogues, translated by M. Bidney, New York, New York State University Press, 2010, p. 86. 
56 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza, op. cit., p. 201.
57 Ibidem. Jellinek was quoting from Eins und Alles (1821). For the English translation see: J. W. 
Goethe, One and All, in T. Mann (ed. by), The Permanent Goethe, translated by D. S. Young, New York, 
the Dial Press, 1948, p. 644.
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In contrast, Jellinek noted, Spinoza’s view was constantly turned to the “Whole”, 
to “Nature, not to the single thing, the individual”58:
He [Spinoza] voluntarily distanced himself from human society, which, for him, 
represented an extraordinary laboratory for the material and spiritual needs of indi-
viduals but was not an organic All, and what he most profoundly desired was only 
that it did not disturb him, ensuring him freedom of thought.59
Jellinek	defined	even	more	explicitly	the	influence,	in	his	opinion,	of	Spinoza	on	
Goethe: the poet had so embraced Spinoza’s “universalistic” character and in par-
ticular his “pantheistic” concept, but, according to Jellinek, also knew how to recog-
nize the value of the individual, yet without ever putting the individual in opposition 
to the “Whole”. The Goethe Jellinek spoke of in his essay of 1878 seemed very akin 
not only to Spinoza but also to Leibniz, and certainly distant from Schopenhauer. 
Jellinek could thus observe that:
Spinoza’s	philosophy	has	often	been	defined	an	“a	cosmism,”	a	philosophical	sys-
tem in which the world disappears, because within it, all fades and is absorbed into 
a divine substance that exists in reality. Goethe instead rediscovered God in the 
world, which is so full of the divine spirit but also contains a full and diverse wealth 
of facets.60
It was Goethe, according to Jellinek, who “conducted” the philosophy of Spinoza 
into the nineteenth century; because of him, great German philosophers like Hegel 
and Schelling could “appropriate” the lesson of Spinoza according to which “the 
world can be understood in its entirety, it rests on a fundamental principle, and the 
true explanation of things cannot be anything but monistic”.61
Nevertheless, it was in Goethe that Jellinek recognized the great merit of having 
enriched Spinoza’s “monism” by that same virtue that Jellinek in his essay of 1872 
had recognized in Leibniz: the ability to think and see “the independence of the indi-
vidual and development of the Whole”.62
58 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza, op. cit., p. 202.
59 Ibidem.
60 Ibidem, pp. 203-204.
61 Ibidem, pp. 205-206.
62 G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauung Leibniz‘ und Schopenhauerp, op. cit., p. 49.
Sara Lagi               The Formation of a Liberal Thinker... 
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de  las Ideas Políticas    
Vol. 19. Núm. 1 (2016): 59-76
74
4. Young Jellinek: the “Whole” and the “Individual”
It is not our intention to discuss the accuracy or objectivity of the interpretations 
of Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Goethe, and Spinoza in Jellinek’s essays referenced here. 
Instead, we start from the supposition that interest lies in throwing light on certain 
aspects of Jellinekian Weltanschauung in a period of his life still remote from the 
works of his maturity. From a perspective of the history of political thought, what do 
the dissertation of 1872 and essay of 1878 inform us about Jellinek? What do these 
two writings tell us of his liberal vision, discussed at the beginning of our analysis?
The philosophical preferences that emerge from these early writings reveal much 
of the intellectual vision of the Hebrew-German thinker: he admired Leibniz and 
Spinoza for the “universalistic” character of their philosophy; both were, in his opin-
ion, “true philosophers”, because in both philosophies Jellinek perceived an essen-
tially optimistic vision. Moreover, in Leibniz and Schopenhauer he noted:
Schopenhauer correctly observed that every pantheism is necessarily optimistic, 
because in the moment in which—as is the case with Spinoza—the individual is 
resolved	into	the	Divine,	individual	pain	and	suffering	disappear	and	are	nullified	
among the sufferings of all. The great philosophers of the past and present—Plato, 
Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel—thought in universalistic terms.63
What seemed to fascinate the young Jellinek and, above all, what he saw in these 
great authors of the past was the ability to think in terms of the “Whole”. And it is in 
this	light	we	better	understand	Jellinek’s	fierce	criticism	directed	toward	Schopen-
hauer and Schopenhauer’s “antiuniversalistic” vision and “subjectivism” that saw 
struggle, despair, and division everywhere. 
However, for Jellinek, the “universalistic” Weltanschauung also presupposed 
the equally important ability to understand the mutual relationship between 
the «Whole and the individual» as, in his opinion, especially Goethe had been 
able	 to	 do.	 Jellinek	 stressed	 the	 influence	 of	 Spinoza	 and	 Spinoza’s	 principle	
of “God-Nature” on Goethe and on Goethe’s art. But, at the same time, in his 
favorite	 poet	 Jellinek	 identified	 an	 element	 of	 further	 complexity	 and	 novelty	
in regard to Spinoza, and this element is, in our opinion, of great importance: 
Jellinek retained the view that Goethe was capable of valuing the “individual, 
the single thing, individuality”, without, however, ever forgetting the “Whole”. 
Jellinek cited in fact Goethe’s poem One and All, in which each of us is part of 
an “eternal chain”.64 
63 Ibidem, p. 27.
64 See: J. W. Goethe, One and All, op. cit.
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And it is on this level of analysis that, between Spinoza and Goethe, the un-
questionable, decisive, absolute preference of the German thinker was the father 
of Faust. This latter, according to the young scholar, accentuated in his art and life 
the importance and value of the “individual”, the importance and value of “indi-
vidual originality”, and for this Jellinek admired him and recalled in this sense a 
particularly	significant	passage	in	the	poem	Doemon (Daimon):
As on the day which gave you to this world,
The Sun assumed its place to greet planets,
At	once	you	flourished	and	continued	thus	to	grow,
According to the law of your beginning.
So	must	you	be,	you	cannot	flee	yourself,	
So sibyls often said, as well as prophets, 
And neither time nor might can break to pieces
A molded form, which through its life evolves.65
And it is the endorsement of the individual who, according to Jellinek, brought 
Goethe to embrace and make his own the Kantian principle of “developing oneself”, 
distancing himself thus from his beloved Spinoza.66
The Jellinekian interpretation of Goethe extends beyond, in our opinion, the 
disciplinary	field	of	the	history	of	philosophical	thought,	history	of	ideas	and	the	
history of literature. Such an interpretation speaks to us of an intellectual, a young 
scholar who already in the 1870s considered it fundamental to think in dual terms, 
to philosophically recognize the “Whole” and “the single thing”, and who, as 
emerges from the essay of 1878, attributed to the individual a positive value in 
terms	of	progress	and	development.	It	may	first	be	noted	that	already	in	the	early	
writings just discussed, fully present is a “communitarian” worldview that, accord-
ing to Massimo La Torre, characterizes the work of the jurist, that is, the idea that 
the “individual” should always be involved and included in the “Whole” and that 
from the “Whole” the “actions of individuals” are fully understood.67  
In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 useful	 to	 remember	 that	 Jellinek	 fiercely	 criticized	
Schopenhauer, because he sees in the work and thought of the German philosopher an 
expression of “extreme subjectivism”, a vision that poses at its center solely and exclu-
sively the “individual” in contrast with the world considered imperfect and full of suf-
fering and deception. Jellinek thus polemically summarized Schopenhauer’s concept: 
65 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza, op. cit, p. 200. Jellinek quoted from Goethe’s 
poem Doemon (1821). For the English translation see: J. W. Goethe, Daimon, in Id., Blesses Longing. 
Selected Poems of J. W. Goethe, translated by K. Stanton, Canada, Trafford Publications, 2007, p. 117.
66 G. Jellinek, Die Beziehungen Goethes zu Spinoza, op. cit., p. 201.
67 M. La Torre, La crisi del Novecento, op. cit., p. 36.
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Subjectivism is the fundamental character of his philosophical system; the indi-
vidual represents, in his opinion, the whole world, the macrocosm and microcosm. 
Hence his inability to understand historical phenomena and to identify with another 
individuality. [...] Only one who—with Faustian impetus—does not recognize the 
order underlying the Whole, only one who deduces from the incompleteness of the 
one the imperfection of the Whole, only such a person can consider this world the 
worst of all possible worlds.68
However, in light of the analysis conducted so far, we would like to advance 
a	 further	 reflection.	 It	 is	widely	held	 that	 Jellinek’s	 jurispolitical	 conception	 is	
deeply liberal: he deeply regards subjective public rights, the self-limitation of 
the State, the importance and necessity to defend minorities and individual free-
doms. But this very conception presupposes a fundamental consideration that al-
ready fully emerges from the writings so far analyzed, in particular from the essay 
on Goethe and Spinoza: the idea that an individual dimension does exist—indi-
vidual, individuality etc.—and as such must be recognized and valued.  Certainly, 
Jellinek placed this dimension in relation to the “Whole”, which can sometimes 
be understood and more concretely so as the State or community, but that, in 
our opinion, does not render this aspect less relevant. Jellinek is a liberal thinker 
because he is capable of giving thought to the “individual, to the single thing”,69 
and this ability is an element worthy of due consideration when we confront and 
analyze his Staatslehre, in which the State “pulls back,” limits itself in light of 
and	in	respect	to	individuals.	In	his	early	writings,	a	particular	cognizance	finds	
expression, a particular Weltanschauung, which, in my opinion, will continue to 
be presupposed also in the works of his maturity.
In this sense, in our opinion, the two essays of the 1870s deserve to be considered 
and re-evaluated as the stages of a long theoretical, intellectual, and personal process 
that in subsequent years would bring Jellinek, jurist and political thinker, to develop 
a jurispolitical worldview that belongs with full force to the history of European 
liberal thought and tradition of the 1800s.     
68 G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauungen  Leibniz‘ und Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 21.
69	For	the	key	role	played	by	this	specific	aspect	within	the	long-term	tradition	of	European	liberalism	
see: D. J. Manning, Liberalism, London, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1976; G. Bedeschi, Storia del pensiero 
liberale, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2004.
